Quick answer
LDAP signing makes domain controllers reject unsigned LDAP connections, and LDAP channel binding ties a login to the specific encrypted LDAPS connection it was made on. Together they stop attackers relaying captured Windows logins to Active Directory, where a relayed login can be used to create accounts, change permissions or take over computers.
On this page
Active Directory is managed over LDAP. If a domain controller accepts unsigned LDAP, or LDAPS without channel binding, an attacker who relays someone's Windows login to it can make changes in Active Directory as that user, and machine accounts relayed this way are often enough to take over servers.
How It Works
| Control | Protects | Domain controller setting |
|---|---|---|
| LDAP signing | LDAP on port 389 | "Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements" set to Require signing |
| LDAP channel binding | LDAPS on port 636 | "Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements" set to Always |
| Client signing | Clients that talk LDAP | "Network security: LDAP client signing requirements" set to Require signing |
Domain controllers log event 2889 for unsigned binds and events 3039 to 3041 for channel binding problems once diagnostic logging is turned on, which is how you find clients that would break.
Why It Matters
LDAP relay turns ordinary footholds into domain-level changes. With coercion through the WebClient service, an attacker can make a machine authenticate over HTTP and relay it to LDAP even where SMB signing is required. It is a frequent critical finding in internal tests because the safe settings were not the default on older domains.
How to Test for It
- Check each domain controller's effective LDAP signing and channel binding settings.
- Turn on LDAP interface event logging and review events 2889 and 3039 to 3041 for a few weeks to find dependent clients.
- In an authorised test, attempt relay to LDAP and LDAPS to confirm whether it succeeds.
How to Reduce the Risk
Audit first, fix or replace clients that use unsigned or simple binds, then enforce signing and channel binding on every domain controller. Use LDAPS or signed SASL binds in applications, and keep the WebClient service disabled on servers where it is not needed. Pair this with required SMB signing, fixes for AD CS relay (ESC8 and ESC11) and a plan to restrict NTLM.
Regulatory and Framework Context
For Australian organisations, LDAP signing and channel binding are part of ASD's guidance on hardening and detecting Active Directory compromise. We test relay to LDAP in every Active Directory security assessment.
Latest intel on this topic
- November Patch Tuesday: An Overflowing Cornucopia of CVEsDark Reading · 10 November 2026
- Updated guidance on detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromisesASD's ACSC · 15 September 2026
- ROPC - So, you think you have MFA?Embrace The Red · 20 October 2022
- gospray - Simple LDAP bind-based password spray toolEmbrace The Red · 18 September 2022
- Active Directory and MacOSEmbrace The Red · 21 June 2019
Updated hourly from the daily briefing.
Common questions
What is the difference between LDAP signing and channel binding?
Signing protects plain LDAP (port 389) by requiring signed messages. Channel binding protects LDAPS (port 636) by binding the login to the TLS session. Attackers can relay to whichever one is not protected, so you need both.
Will enforcing LDAP signing break anything?
It can break older applications, appliances and scripts that use simple or unsigned LDAP binds. Auditing first with domain controller event 2889, and channel binding events 3039 to 3041, shows which clients would fail before you enforce.
Did Microsoft make this the default?
Microsoft has tightened the defaults over several releases, and newer domain controllers enforce more by default, but many existing domains still run with compatible, unenforced settings. Check your actual policy rather than relying on version defaults.
What is the attack this stops?
NTLM relay to LDAP: an attacker forces or captures a Windows login and relays it to a domain controller, then uses that session to add a computer account, configure resource-based constrained delegation or add shadow credentials, leading to control of servers or the domain.
Change log
- 14 November 2026First published.