Quick answer
Active Directory attack tools are the programs used to map, attack and move through Windows domains. The core set is BloodHound for finding attack paths, Impacket and NetExec for using credentials across the network, Certipy for certificate attacks, Rubeus for Kerberos, and Responder and Coercer for capturing and relaying logins. Criminals and authorised testers use the same tools.
On this page
Almost every serious intrusion into a Windows organisation goes through Active Directory, and almost every one uses some of the same public tools. Knowing what they do, and what each looks like from the defender's side, is the quickest way to understand how a single compromised account becomes a domain-wide breach. This guide covers the core tools and the newer ones we see in current engagements.
How It Works
Attacks on Active Directory follow a pattern: map the domain, get or capture credentials, escalate privileges, then move across hosts. Each stage has its standard tools.
| Tool | Stage | What it does | What defenders watch for |
|---|---|---|---|
| BloodHound (Community Edition) | Mapping | Graphs users, groups, sessions and permissions to show attack paths to domain admin | Large bursts of LDAP and session enumeration from one account |
| SharpHound, RustHound-CE | Mapping | Collect the data BloodHound analyses (Windows and cross-platform collectors) | The same enumeration, often from a workstation |
| PowerView, ldeep | Mapping | Query users, groups, trusts, shares and delegation settings | Unusual LDAP queries for sensitive attributes |
| Impacket | Credentials and movement | Python scripts for SMB, Kerberos, LDAP and RPC: remote execution (psexec, wmiexec, smbexec), secretsdump, ticket requests and relay (ntlmrelayx) | Service creation and remote execution from unexpected sources, DCSync replication requests |
| NetExec (nxc) | Credentials and movement | Tests credentials across many hosts at once, finds local admin access, runs modules | One account authenticating to many hosts in minutes |
| Kerbrute | Credentials | Finds valid usernames and password-sprays through Kerberos | Many Kerberos pre-authentication failures (event 4771) |
| Rubeus | Credentials | Kerberos abuse: Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting, ticket requests and forging | Spikes in service ticket requests with weak encryption (event 4769) |
| Responder, mitm6 | Credentials | Poison name resolution and IPv6 DHCP to capture logins on the local network | LLMNR and NBT-NS responses from workstations, rogue DHCPv6 |
| Coercer | Relay | Forces servers to authenticate using PetitPotam, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce and similar | RPC calls to EFSR, RPRN and DFSNM interfaces on domain controllers |
| Certipy, Certify | Escalation | Find and exploit AD CS misconfigurations (ESC1 to ESC16) | Certificate requests naming a different user, template changes (events 4886, 4887, 4899) |
| bloodyAD, PassTheCert | Escalation | Change AD permissions and objects over LDAP, including with certificates | Unexpected changes to ACLs, group membership and delegation |
| pyWhisker, Whisker | Escalation | Add shadow credentials (msDS-KeyCredentialLink) to take over accounts | Writes to msDS-KeyCredentialLink |
| Mimikatz | Credentials | Extracts passwords, hashes and tickets from Windows memory | LSASS access; most EDR flags it on sight |
| DonPAPI | Credentials | Collects DPAPI-protected secrets such as saved browser and credential-manager passwords | Remote access to user profile secrets across many hosts |
| SCCMHunter and SCCM attack tools | Escalation | Abuse Configuration Manager (SCCM/MECM) misconfigurations, such as network access accounts and client push | Unexpected SCCM policy requests and client push authentication |
| Hashcat | Credentials | Cracks captured hashes and tickets offline on GPUs | Nothing in your network: cracking happens elsewhere, so weak passwords are the risk |
Why It Matters
These tools are free, well documented and constantly updated, so a capable attacker can go from one phished account to domain admin in hours. Several run entirely from outside your endpoints, using normal Windows protocols, which is why networks with good antivirus still lose their domains. The paths the tools find (excessive permissions, old delegation settings, misconfigured certificate templates, legacy protocols) build up over years and are rarely visible in the admin console.
How to Test for It
- Run BloodHound collection from a standard user account and review every path to tier 0 (domain admins, domain controllers, CA servers, SCCM).
- Test credential exposure: password spraying limits, Kerberoastable and AS-REP roastable accounts, and poisoning on user networks.
- Enumerate AD CS with Certipy and map findings to ESC classes.
- Check relay and coercion paths: SMB and LDAP signing, web enrolment, Print Spooler on domain controllers.
- Check whether each step was detected, and how quickly, so the test measures your monitoring as well as your configuration.
How to Reduce the Risk
Use BloodHound defensively and remove the shortest paths to tier 0 first. Put privileged accounts in Protected Users and keep them off workstations, give service accounts long random passwords or use group managed service accounts, fix AD CS templates, require SMB and LDAP signing, disable LLMNR and NBT-NS, and remove unnecessary permissions and delegation. Make sure domain controller logs (Kerberos, directory changes, replication and certificate events) reach your SIEM with alerts for the behaviours in the table above.
Regulatory and Framework Context
For Australian organisations, ASD's guidance on detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises lists many of these techniques by name, and the Essential Eight restriction of administrative privileges is where most of the fixes land. These tools are used, with permission, in every Active Directory penetration test and red team engagement we run.
Latest intel on this topic
- Google says Russian-speaking hackers ran the first fully automated AI cyberattackCyberScoop · 16 November 2026
- Industry guidelines for offensive cyber tools unveiled through international Pall Mall ProcessCyberScoop · 13 November 2026
- Feds announce seizure of $1.2 billion from Binance theft; also takedown of ‘FaceStealer’ toolsThe Record · 12 November 2026
- Cyber Experts Weigh In: How to Fight Artex & AntiFoxDark Reading · 12 November 2026
- United to block customers from using AI agents, citing cyber threatsThe Record · 12 November 2026
Updated hourly from the daily briefing.
Common questions
What is BloodHound used for?
BloodHound maps who can control what in Active Directory, such as group memberships, admin rights, sessions and permissions, and shows the shortest path from any account to domain admin. Attackers use it to plan; defenders use it to find and remove those paths first.
What replaced CrackMapExec?
NetExec (nxc) is the community continuation of CrackMapExec, which stopped being maintained in 2023. It tests credentials and runs checks across many Windows hosts at once.
Can antivirus or EDR stop these tools?
Good EDR detects many of them on endpoints, but several, such as Impacket and Certipy, run from the attacker's own machine and only appear as network logins and directory queries. Detection has to include domain controller logs and network activity, not just endpoints.
Is it legal to use these tools?
Using them against systems you do not own or are not authorised to test is illegal. Penetration testers use them under a signed scope and rules of engagement.
How do we know which of these would work in our network?
An Active Directory penetration test runs them the way an attacker would, safely and with permission, and reports which paths actually lead to domain compromise and how to close them.
Change log
- 14 November 2026First published.