Quick answer
The ESC attacks are a numbered catalogue of Active Directory Certificate Services misconfigurations, from ESC1 (a template that lets the requester name any user) to ESC16 (a certificate authority that drops the security extension). Each one lets an attacker obtain a certificate for a more privileged identity, often a domain admin, without knowing its password.
On this page
Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is Microsoft's certificate authority role. Certificates it issues can be used to log in to Active Directory, so a mistake in who can request which certificate becomes a way to become someone else. Since the 2021 Certified Pre-Owned research, these mistakes have been catalogued as ESC1, ESC2 and onwards. This page explains every class, in plain English, with the fix for each. For the overview, see AD CS abuse.
How It Works
Every ESC attack ends the same way: the attacker holds a certificate that says they are a more privileged account, and uses it to request a Kerberos ticket (PKINIT) or authenticate over LDAP (Schannel) as that account. The classes differ in which weakness lets them get that certificate.
| Class | The misconfiguration | What the attacker gains |
|---|---|---|
| ESC1 | A client authentication template lets the requester supply the subject (who the certificate is for), and low-privileged users can enrol | A certificate for any user, including domain admins |
| ESC2 | A template allows "Any Purpose" or has no extended key usage, and low-privileged users can enrol | A certificate usable for authentication or as an enrolment agent |
| ESC3 | A template issues Certificate Request Agent certificates to low-privileged users | The right to request certificates on behalf of other users |
| ESC4 | Low-privileged users can edit a certificate template | The ability to make any template vulnerable to ESC1, then use it |
| ESC5 | Weak permissions on other AD CS objects, such as the CA computer, the PKI containers or the NTAuth store | Control of the PKI itself |
| ESC6 | The CA has the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag set | Any template becomes ESC1, because every request can name a user |
| ESC7 | Low-privileged users hold Manage CA or Manage Certificates rights | Approve their own requests, enable ESC6 or issue failed requests |
| ESC8 | Web enrolment or certificate enrolment web services accept NTLM over HTTP | Relay a domain controller's login to get a certificate as the domain controller |
| ESC9 | A template has the security extension disabled (no szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT), combined with weak certificate mapping | Change a controllable account's UPN to impersonate another user |
| ESC10 | Weak certificate mapping settings on domain controllers (registry keys left in compatibility mode) | Impersonation through a UPN change, as in ESC9 |
| ESC11 | The CA accepts certificate requests over RPC without enforcing encryption | Relay NTLM to the CA's RPC interface, the RPC version of ESC8 |
| ESC12 | Shell access to a CA whose private key is kept on a YubiHSM, with the key's password stored in the registry | Use the CA key to forge certificates |
| ESC13 | A template's issuance policy is linked to an AD group (OID group link) | Membership of that group's privileges when using the certificate |
| ESC14 | Weak explicit certificate mappings on accounts (altSecurityIdentities) | Authenticate as an account by obtaining a certificate that matches its mapping |
| ESC15 | Version 1 templates accept requester-supplied application policies (EKUwu, CVE-2024-49019) | A client authentication or enrolment agent certificate from templates that should not allow it |
| ESC16 | The CA is configured to leave the security extension out of every certificate | ESC9-style impersonation across all templates |
Two related issues sit outside the numbering: Certifried (CVE-2022-26923), where a machine account's dNSHostName could be set to a domain controller's to obtain its certificate, and "golden certificates", where an attacker who steals the CA's private key can forge certificates for anyone, indefinitely.
Why It Matters
AD CS is often the fastest path from an ordinary user account to domain admin in an internal test, sometimes in minutes. It is easy to miss because certificate services are set up once and rarely reviewed, the dangerous settings look harmless in the console, and many security tools do not check them. A certificate also outlives a password reset: an attacker who obtained one keeps access until it expires or is revoked.
How to Test for It
- From a standard domain account, enumerate every certificate authority, template and enrolment permission (Certipy or Certify do this in one pass).
- Map each finding to its ESC class and to who can exploit it: everyone, authenticated users, or a specific group.
- Check the CA's flags, web enrolment endpoints (HTTP and HTTPS, with and without Extended Protection) and RPC encryption setting.
- Check domain controller certificate mapping settings and any explicit mappings on privileged accounts.
- In an authorised test, confirm the highest-impact paths by obtaining a certificate for a test target and authenticating with it, then revoke it.
- Check whether certificate requests (event 4886), issuance (4887) and template changes (4899 and 4900) are logged and alerted on.
How to Reduce the Risk
Fix by class: remove "Supply in the request" from authentication templates (ESC1), remove Any Purpose and empty EKUs (ESC2), restrict enrolment agent templates (ESC3), take write rights on templates and PKI objects away from everyone but PKI administrators (ESC4, ESC5), clear EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 (ESC6), audit CA officer and manager rights (ESC7), and require HTTPS with Extended Protection for Authentication on web enrolment, or remove it (ESC8). Enable request encryption on the CA's RPC interface (ESC11), move domain controllers to full certificate mapping enforcement (ESC9, ESC10, ESC16), review explicit mappings and OID group links (ESC13, ESC14), apply the November 2024 updates for ESC15, and protect the CA's private key in hardware with access limited to tier 0 administrators. Treat CA servers as tier 0, the same as domain controllers.
Regulatory and Framework Context
For Australian organisations, AD CS hardening falls under ASD's guidance on detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises, which names AD CS abuse specifically, and the Essential Eight control of restricting administrative privileges. Testing it is a standard part of an Active Directory penetration test.
Latest intel on this topic
- eMudhra fiasco widens: eight more CAs revoked, Microsoft pulls trustiTnews · 12 November 2026
- Critical Zoom Workplace Flaw Could Allow Unauthenticated Remote Privilege EscalationThe Hacker News · 11 November 2026
- EMudhra Intermediate CA Certificates CompromisedUnit 42 · 22 October 2026
- Updated guidance on detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromisesASD's ACSC · 15 September 2026
- Cross-Agent Privilege Escalation: When Agents Free Each OtherEmbrace The Red · 24 September 2025
Updated hourly from the daily briefing.
Common questions
What does ESC stand for in AD CS attacks?
ESC stands for escalation. The numbering started with the 2021 research paper Certified Pre-Owned, which described ESC1 to ESC8, and researchers have added new classes since, up to ESC16.
Which ESC attacks are most common in real networks?
In our internal tests the most frequent are ESC1 (requester-supplied subject), ESC4 (writable templates) and ESC8 (NTLM relay to web enrolment). ESC8 is especially common because the web enrolment role is often installed by default with the CA and never reviewed.
Does patching fix AD CS attacks?
Only some. Microsoft updates closed specific issues such as Certifried (CVE-2022-26923) and ESC15 (CVE-2024-49019), and strong certificate mapping enforcement blunts ESC9 and ESC10. Most ESC classes are configuration problems that no patch changes; the templates and CA settings have to be fixed.
How do we find out whether we are exposed?
Enumerate your certificate templates and CA settings with a tool such as Certipy or Certify from a standard user account, or include AD CS in an internal penetration test, which also confirms which findings are actually exploitable.
Are certificates revoked when we fix a template?
No. Certificates already issued from a vulnerable template stay valid until they expire or are revoked. After fixing a template, review what it issued and revoke anything suspicious.
Change log
- 14 November 2026First published.